OPPOSITION TO GRANT OF A NEW BUSINESS TENANCY ON THE GROUND IN SECTION 30(1)(F) – Landlord’s intention to demolish, reconstruct or carry out substantial work
In this month’s Lay of the Land, I have extracted guidance from some recent helpful cases on the evidence required when the court is considering a landlord’s resistance to a new tenancy on the ground in Paragraph (f) of Section 30(1) of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954. This article considers aspects of:
- the landlord’s subjective intention to carry out work,
- the objective prospects of doing so, and
- the timing of the proposed work, including where the tenant refuses access for preliminary inspection.
Introduction
Section 30(1)(f) of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 provides that the landlord may oppose the grant of a new tenancy on the ground:
“that on the termination of the current tenancy the landlord intends to demolish or reconstruct the premises comprised in the holding or a substantial part of those premises or to carry out substantial work of construction on the holding or part thereof and that he could not reasonably do so without obtaining possession of the holding …”
(This ground is one under which, if successful, the landlord must pay compensation to the tenant.)
In the Supreme Court decision in S Franses Ltd v Cavendish Hotel (London) Ltd [2019] A.C. 249 (2018) Lord Sumption explained that:
…as a statutory interference with the landlord’s proprietary rights, the protection conferred by the Act should be carried no further than the statutory language and purpose require. It confers no more than a qualified security on the tenant. Certain interests of the landlord override whatever security it was intended to confer on the tenant, and one of them is the right to demolish or reconstruct his property in whatever way he chooses at the expiry of the term.
In order to succeed on the Ground in Section 30(1)(f) the landlord must prove that at the time when the court makes the decision, it has:
- a genuine intention to carry out qualifying works on the termination of the current tenancy; and
- a reasonable prospect of practically being able to do so at that time. (Cunliffe v Goodman [1950] 2 KB 237)
The Subjective Element – Genuine Intention
Lord Sumption continued: “the touchstone of ground (f) is a firm and settled intention to carry out the works.”
In proving the subjective element, the landlord’s oral evidence may, in principle, suffice, and no corroboration is strictly needed, but documentary evidence is likely to make the landlord’s case stronger, and it is common for landlords to offer an undertaking to the Court to carry out the works, which normally serves as powerful evidence of intention.
Section 37A provides for compensation where a refusal to order a new tenancy can be shown to have resulted from a misrepresentation or concealment of relevant facts. That includes a misrepresentation of intention, if it can be proved. The courts acknowledge that even a settled intention can change and it may be difficult for a tenant to prove misrepresentation as to the landlord’s intention as at the relevant time.
In McDonald’s Restaurants Ltd v Shirayama Shokusan Company Ltd [2024] EWHC 1133 (Ch), a case on Section 30(1)(g), the landlord had a genuine firm and settled intention to use the premises for the purposes of its own business, but at trial gave a raft of oral evidence, in relation to the details of the nature of the business, together with a business plan, which was later found to be a tissue of lies. The consequences of yielding to the temptation to embellish details, perhaps to make the Landlord’s intention seem more settled, were that the landlord, though successful in resisting the grant of a new tenancy, was held liable for compensation under Section 37A, and risked contempt and perjury proceedings. Such temptation should be resisted.
Where a landlord gives oral evidence, it is open to a judge to find that there was no such intention, but reasons must be given for disbelieving the landlord. For example, in GT Motoring Solutions Ltd v Williams [2023] 1WLUK 231, HHJ Kelly, in the County Court at Leeds, considered the evidence that the landlords’ subjective intentions had chopped and changed to a degree that there was no
“firm and settled subjective desire for redevelopment. I do not find that the proposal for doing the work has moved out of the zone of contemplation and into the valley of decision.
…
I accept the submission made on behalf of the landlords that it is not necessary for the landlord to establish all the details for any redevelopment in order to establish the requisite intention. However, given the evidence of wavering intention as to what to do with the premises and taking into account all of the matters set out above, I do not find that the landlords have established a firm and settled desire to demolish and redevelop.”
The Landlord’s express evidence was that it intended to demolish and reconstruct the premises. While in principle, it is sufficient for a landlord to establish an intention only to demolish, the fact that the landlord’s evidence was it intended to demolish in order to reconstruct and that it could not get permission to demolish without planning permission for the development prevented the judge from finding a clear and settled intention to demolish only.
Considering the two above cases, it appears that the landlord must not embellish its evidence so as to provide more detail than is truly supported by its firm and settled intention, but that it must beware giving the impression of “wavering intention”. It may be helpful for a landlord to be as clear as possible as to which parts of its intention are firm and settled and which are still to be decided.
A landlord’s intention to carry out the relevant works, though genuine, may exist only for the purposes of gaining vacant possession of the demise by satisfying the statutory test. In S Franses Ltd v Cavendish Hotel (London) Ltd, [2019] A.C. 249 (2018) the landlord, unusually, admitted that to be the case, as the proposed works, though reasonably capable of being carried out, could serve no practical or economic purpose.
“… landlords with proposals like these will … need only supply the tenant with a schedule of works substantial and disruptive enough to be inconsistent with his continued occupation. If the landlord’s argument is correct, the tenant will have no incentive to go to court just to get an undertaking to carry out the works, from which he could derive no possible benefit. He will recognise defeat and leave voluntarily. The landlord will then have no need to give an undertaking to the court and no reason to carry out the works.”
Such a practice on the part of a landlord may very well be considered to be contrary to the very purpose of Part II, defeating security of tenure for tenants. The Supreme Court considered it so. Accordingly, while affirming the established principle that it was the Landlord’s intention, as opposed to purpose or motive, that was under consideration, such an intention must not be conditional on the tenant’s choosing to assert its claim to a new tenancy.
“… a conditional intention of this kind is not the fixed and settled intention that ground (f) requires…. The acid test is whether the landlord would intend to do the same works if the tenant left voluntarily.”
The Supreme Court went on to consider the hypothetical case where a landlord intended to carry out part of the works unconditionally, and introduced spurious work only for the purposes of obtaining vacant possession. In such a case, the tenant’s claim to a new tenancy would fall to be resolved by reference only to the works which the landlord unconditionally intended.
Thus, while the landlord’s motive and purpose are not themselves determinative, they may be relevant when determining whether the landlord’s intention is genuine, settled and unconditional.
Landlords should be advised to focus on providing comprehensive evidence focused strictly on the work that they unconditionally intend to do.
The Objective Element – a reasonable prospect of being able to carry out the work
The landlord does not have to show, on the balance of probabilities, that the work will be able to be carried out. For instance, it is not for the court, in a hearing of a preliminary issue in 1954 Act cases, to decide questions that may in due course be submitted to the planning authority. (Gregson v Cyril Lord [1963] 1WLR 41). The landlord must rather show that it has a real chance, as opposed to a merely fanciful one.
Notwithstanding the above, the burden rests squarely with the landlord. For example, if planning permission is required but has not yet been obtained, there must be sufficient evidence that there is a reasonable prospect of it being obtained, and it is for the landlord to show a real chance that any necessary finance will be raised.
In GT Motoring, referred to above, seven out of the ten reports needed to be considered for planning consent had not been obtained. The fact that the tenants would not grant access for the purpose of obtaining the reports was irrelevant, there being no obligation on the tenants to grant access to the landlord for any such purpose. An architect gave evidence of fact, but her opinion of the likelihood that planning permission would be obtained, or the likely length of time it would take to obtain the reports, was not admissible – permission not having been given for expert evidence. The Landlord had provided no evidence of the likely cost of development. The landlord was a trust, and there was no evidence as to the mechanism by which trust monies could be accessed. There was no evidence of a builder being available to reconstruct after demolition.
Such was the failure of the landlord to provide sufficient evidence of a reasonable prospect of carrying out the work that it was not difficult for the tenant to demolish the landlord’s case at trial, without calling any evidence. The judge rejected a submission that it was for the tenant to identify impediments as “putting the cart before the horse”. Practitioners representing tenants seeking a new tenancy in the face of opposition on the ground in question may find the report of GT Motoring v Williams ([2023] 1WLUK 231) , available on Westlaw, to be a useful source of arguments to attack a landlord’s opposition on the ground in question.
In Pridewell Properties v Spirit Pub Co (Managed) Ltd [2026] EWHC 953 (Ch), the landlord was successful in showing a realistic prospect that that finance was in principle available to carry out the work, but among its evidence were term sheets from the lenders indicating that they would require the landlord’s directors / shareholders to provide guarantees. Fatally to its ground of opposition, the landlord had provided no evidence as to its directors’ personal finances, and the High Court upheld the first instance judge’s refusal to hold that the ground was made out on the basis of the absence of such evidence.
The above cases are indicative of the need for a landlord to cover all bases and address every conceivable impediment in order to show a reasonable prospect of being able to carry out the work.
Timing – “On the termination of the tenancy”
What if preliminary inspection is necessary in order to obtain planning permission?
The Pridewell case referred to above, an appellate decision of the High Court handed down in May 2026, clarifies a misapprehension as to the timing of proposed works. It was early on established that the statutory phrase “On the termination of the tenancy” did not mean that ‘the bulldozers would arrive the next day’ but “that it is the settled intention to end this tenancy for this purpose and that the work will begin, not at any long delayed time, but on the termination of the tenancy” (Reohorn v Barry Corporation [1956] 1 WLR 845 at 852).
For the next 70 years, caselaw had variously begun to suggest that “within a reasonable time” might be an adequate approximation of the statutory requirement, but Pridewell illustrates an important subtlety in that analysis.
The landlord had not been able to apply for planning permission because it had been (lawfully) refused access by the tenant, which access was required to undertake the necessary acoustic survey. The judge in the Central London County Court, who was an experienced circuit judge, held that, in the circumstances, 10-14 months was a reasonable time, in the light of the explanation for the delay, for works to begin such that it could be said that there was an intention to carry out the relevant work “on the termination of the tenancy”. The High Court held that the judge had misdirected himself and explained that the expression “within a reasonable time” was only a paraphrase of the statutory test, which did not permit such a delay notwithstanding any explanation. Fancourt J held:
62. … I consider that the Judge addressed a subtly different question from the question that the 1954 Act requires, and that his evaluation was therefore flawed. The question is not whether the estimation of the length of the delay is reasonable, on the evidence, but whether, given that a delay of that length is likely, the Landlord could be said to intend to carry out the works “on the termination of the current tenancy”, i.e. by a reasonable time after that termination.
It was pointed out that the 1954 Act contains a “near miss” provision in Section 31(2) which allows a court to defer the termination date by up to one year if it considers that the ground in s30(1)(f) would have been made out at a later date than that specified.
If the tenant refuses access (and there is no provision for the landlord to have access for the purpose) then, if this would delay matters, then the Landlord cannot be said to intend to carry out the works “on the termination of the tenancy”, but the landlord might be better off arguing for a short term on renewal, and a provision in the new tenancy which allows access for the purpose of surveying for planning application.
The fact that the Landlord could not prove its ground of opposition at the trial heard by the Judge (on a preliminary issue, namely whether the ground of opposition could be proved) does not mean that it cannot do its redevelopment (if it obtains planning permission). The policy of the Act is to facilitate redevelopment, while providing reasonable security of tenure for tenants. Thus, when the Tenant’s application returns to the County Court for the terms of the new tenancy to be determined, the Landlord can argue for a 1-year (or shorter) term, and for the terms of the new tenancy to include a right to enter to carry out the necessary surveys and tests. That will no doubt have an impact on the market rent for the new tenancy, but the Landlord is not entitled to have it all ways. Alternatively, the Landlord could seek a redevelopment break option, which would permit it to terminate the new tenancy if and when it was in a position to prove ground (f).
Conclusion
- A subjective intention to demolish or reconstruct may be found from a landlord’s uncorroborated evidence alone, but such evidence is clearly more effective if supported by documentary evidence, and an undertaking to carry out the work.
- Compensation is likely to be payable (not to mention other potential consequences for contempt of court) if the court is misled as to the landlord’s intention. Landlords must resist the temptation to embellish so as to furnish details which may not be their true settled intention.
- The landlord’s motive for carrying out works (as opposed to intention to carry them out) is not determinative, but motive may go to an assessment of the genuineness and nature of the intention. The court will be alive to the possibility that the intention, while genuine, may be a convenient smokescreen which only subsists so long as a tenant does not vacate by consent, and such a conditional intention will not suffice.
- The landlord need not show on the balance of probabilities that it will be able to carry out the relevant works, but only that it has a reasonable prospect of so doing. However, there must be some evidence addressing every potential impediment eg planning and financial.
- The statutory ground relies on work being able to begin “on the termination of the tenancy”. That does not necessarily mean that work must start on the day of termination, but there is no allowance for a “reasonable delay in the circumstances”.
- The lawful refusal of a tenant to allow access for preliminary surveys / tests is no excuse for the failure of a landlord to show that work will begin “on the termination of the tenancy”. If such a refusal means that work cannot start at the required time then the landlord may be advised to argue for terms of a new tenancy which provide for a shorter term and a right of entry to carry out the necessary surveys, or, if the delay is likely to be less than 1 year, to avail itself of the near-miss provision in Section 31(2).
This article reflects the law as of the date it was published. Whilst every effort has been taken to ensure that the law in this article is correct, it is intended to give a general overview of the law for educational and/or informational purposes. It is not intended to be a substitute for specific legal advice and should not be relied upon for this purpose. This article represents the opinion of the author and does not necessarily reflect the view of any other member of St Philips Chambers.
